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Some 10 years ago, it was proposed that
different quantities, including time, space
or number, are processed by a common
mechanism (Walsh, 2003; Pinel et al.,
2004; Cohen Kadosh et al., 2005), hence-
forth called generalized magnitude sys-
tem (GMS). This presented an important
attempt at theoretically integrating data
across various literatures, and became very
influential (e.g., Burr et al., 2010; Lourenco
and Longo, 2011; Bonato et al., 2012).
However, in this paper we will evaluate the
concept in a critical way. We first argue
that such a mechanism faces conceptual
difficulties. Second, we look at empirical
findings that were proposed to support a
GMS and will offer a different explanation
of these findings based on computational
modeling and recent empirical observa-
tions. Third, we review positive evidence
in favor of distinct magnitude mecha-
nisms. We discuss alternatives for a GMS
in a final paragraph.
A first difficulty a GMS faces is the met-
ric to code different types of magnitudes.
What common metric allows comparing
the loudness of a tone to the duration of
a stimulus or the meaning of an Arabic
digit? In other words, what is the scale
factor that relates one magnitude dimen-
sion to another? One strong interpretation
of the GMS would imply that there is
a single common currency on which all
dimensions can be mapped. Early stud-
ies addressed this issue for one particular
pair of dimensions, namely event counts
and time (duration). A scale factor of 1:5
was obtained, in which the representation
of one count is equivalent to 200ms of
time (Meck and Church, 1983). However,
it was demonstrated that a single scale fac-
tor fails to explain all observations (e.g.,
Balci and Gallistel, 2006). Furthermore,
numerical effects on the magnitude of grip
aperture are flexibly modulated by the rel-
ative magnitude of the numbers on a spe-
cific trial (Chiou et al., 2012). In other
words, the scale factor by which one mag-
nitude is mapped to another can change
on a trial-by-trial base. To fit the frame-
work of a GMS, the common metric thus
has to be sensitive to the relative magni-
tude in a specific context. This flexibility
of the scaling factor violates the prediction
from a GMS for a common monotonic
mapping of quantities (Bueti and Walsh,
2009). Another difficulty for a common
monotonic mapping concerns metathetic
dimensions, i.e. magnitude dimensions
that lack an intrinsic polarity (Stevens,
1957). What is, for example, the larger
magnitude when judging luminance? If
luminance is defined with respect to black,
increasing darkness then increases the
magnitude. On the other hand, if lumi-
nance is defined with respect to white,
magnitude should decrease with increas-
ing darkness. Another issue concerns the
specific problem the brain faces when
representing numbers. From a computa-
tional point of view, representing numbers
is inherently different from represent-
ing other magnitude dimensions, such
as luminance, surface area, or weight. A
problem specific for processing numeros-
ity is that it requires the individuation
of objects independent of their non-
numerical features. How the brain repre-
sents numbers is therefore likely to depend
on a unique set of neural properties.
These unique properties to encode dis-
crete numerosities could be the reason why
differences in processing between discrete
and continuous magnitudes have been
observed (Castelli et al., 2006).
Concerning the second argument,
much of the evidence in favor of a
GMS comes from the observation that
behavioral effects can be very similar
across stimulus types, or that they interact
with each other. One important behav-
ioral effect that has often been used to
argue along these lines is the comparison
distance effect (CDE). The CDE indi-
cates a decrease in response times when
the magnitude between two stimuli that
need to be compared increases (Moyer and
Landauer, 1967). The presence of a CDE
when comparing different types of stimuli,
such as numbers, luminance, weight and
even social status, has led to the suggestion
that the representations of these stimuli
must overlap (e.g., Moyer and Landauer,
1967; Chiao et al., 2004). However, as we
have demonstrated before (Verguts et al.,
2005; Van Opstal et al., 2008) the CDE
can originate from the pattern of connec-
tions from input coding neurons to the
decision and response neurons, relevant
for the magnitude comparison task (e.g.,
“Left stimulus is larger”). In particular,
the CDE may result from a competition
in the decision process that is determined
by the monotonically increasing pattern in
these connection weights (see Van Opstal
et al., 2008 for full details). In fact, this
connectivity pattern automatically devel-
ops from the requirements of a magnitude
comparison task, and a CDE will thus be
observed for any stimulus type trained
on this task. Therefore, the presence of a
CDE across stimulus types does not imply
a common representation or dedicated
magnitude processing system. Instead,
similar effects may arise from similar com-
putational constraints across tasks. For a
similar argument in the context of the size
congruity effect, see Santens and Verguts
(2011).
Similarly, if the CDE does not origi-
nate from stimulus representation, brain
activity that correlates with the CDE is
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not necessarily caused by the activation of
the stimulus representation. Rather than
revealing a common representation for
different stimulus types (e.g., Pinel et al.,
2004; Cohen Kadosh et al., 2005), this
activity could be related to decisional or
comparison processes (e.g., Gobel et al.,
2004). The observation that different types
of stimuli evoke a CDE in the same brain
area does therefore not argue for a shared
magnitude representation.
Third, recent investigations have
revealed positive evidence against a GMS.
A GMS implies a shared neuronal sub-
strate for magnitude. It is commonly
assumed that the intraparietal sulcus
(IPS) is the most likely candidate for
a shared neuronal space because of its
strong involvement in number process-
ing (for reviews see Dehaene et al., 2003;
Cohen Kadosh et al., 2008). However, neu-
ral recordings in monkey IPS by Tudusciuc
and Nieder (2007) revealed no correlation
between neurons’ tuning for analog and
discrete quantities. Also, across length and
duration tasks, Genovesio et al. (2012)
found no correlation in magnitude tuning
in macaque prefrontal neurons. However,
they did find a very strong correlation
across length, duration, and matching
tasks for the task-relevant feature (e.g.,
cells preferring “Choose green stimulus”
in one task also preferred it in another
task), suggesting that these neurons coded
decision/response processes rather than
abstract magnitude. Similar results were
obtained with functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (fMRI) studies in humans.
In one study, a discrete/analog response
task was used to investigate if analog and
discrete quantities are processed in the
same brain area (Castelli et al., 2006).
In this task, participants have to judge
whether there is more green or blue on
a display. The amount of green and blue
could vary continuously (analog) or in
discrete areas in time or space. Results
revealed that different areas of the IPS
were involved for analog and discrete
quantities for both temporal and spatial
conditions. Others found that the IPS is
not activated more during non-symbolic
numerosity processing than during a
same-different color discrimination task
that does not involve magnitude (Shuman
and Kanwisher, 2004). This indicates that
IPS is not specifically activated for the
processing of non-symbolic numerosi-
ties. As noted by these authors, a coherent
theory of magnitude processing in IPS
that includes symbolic number and other
magnitudes (e.g., lines, angles, and lumi-
nances) but that excludes the assessment
of non-symbolic numerosity is difficult to
imagine. Transcranial magnetic stimula-
tion (TMS) of the IPS revealed a similar
distributed pattern of magnitude process-
ing. Stimulation of the left IPS slowed
down performance in a numerosity com-
parison task, whereas left (or right) IPS
stimulation did not affect duration com-
parison (Dormal et al., 2008). Dormal and
colleagues showed a similar dissociation
between duration and number process-
ing in non-demented Parkinson’s disease
patients: Whereas the patient group suf-
fered from a decrease in performance
compared to controls in a duration task,
this was not the case in a numerosity com-
parison task (Dormal et al., 2012). Recent
research also demonstrated impaired time
perception in children with difficulties in
numbers and mathematics, but failed to
show a correlation between timing perfor-
mance and mathematical abilities (Hurks
and Van Loosbroek, 2012; Vicario et al.,
2012). Here, the interaction between time
and numbers was attributed to differ-
ences in the internal clock (Hurks and
Van Loosbroek, 2012), or to differences
in attention or sensitivity (Vicario et al.,
2012). An interesting pattern of results
was demonstrated by Rusconi et al. (2006)
who found interactions between pitch
height and space in trained musicians
independent of the relevance of pitch
height in the task. In non-trained musi-
cians, however, an interaction was only
observed when both pitch height and
space were relevant for the task. When
only an implicit reference was made for
pitch height comparisons, no interaction
was observed. This suggests a necessity to
explicitly encode stimuli to obtain interac-
tion effects in this population. This is also
witnessed by the flexibility of the map-
ping from numbers to space (e.g., Fischer
et al., 2010; Van Dijck and Fias, 2011)
demonstrating that the monotonic coding
between magnitude dimensions is not as
straightforward as suggested by a GMS.
To deal with these conceptual and
empirical problems, weakened versions of
a GMS and alternative proposals have
been put forward. One suggestion is
that different magnitude representations
are processed separately, but interact at
later decisional or motor stages. Separate
dimension specific representations might
share a decision procedure or a common
comparison process (e.g., Feigenson, 2007;
Chiou et al., 2012; Dewind and Brannon,
2012; Vicario, 2013). This echoes with our
suggestion that the CDE is related to deci-
sion processes and is therefore observed
whenever the magnitude of two stimuli
is compared (Van Opstal et al., 2008; see
also Cohen Kadosh et al., 2008). Previous
work demonstrated that the interaction
between different magnitude dimensions,
such as space and numbers, can also orig-
inate from similar interactions at the deci-
sion stage (Gevers et al., 2006). In line
with this, it was recently proposed that
the observed interaction between random
movement generation and the perception
of numbers (Daar and Pratt, 2008; Vicario,
2012) could be caused by an early competi-
tion between decisional processes (Vicario,
2012). An alternative but not mutually
exclusive suggestion is that the mapping
of different magnitudes onto each other
occurs in working memory because of
task demands. The importance of how
stimuli are encoded in working memory
was recently investigated for the interac-
tion between numbers and space. When
participants were asked to retain a series
of numbers in memory while they were
performing a go/no-go parity judgment
task, Van Dijck and Fias (2011) showed
that the relation between numbers and
space depended on the serial encoding of
the number stimuli in working memory
rather than the magnitude of the num-
bers. The observation that an interaction
between different types of magnitude is
only present when they are part of the
task context (Cappelletti et al., 2011) or in
trained experts (Rusconi et al., 2006) could
also point to the need to actively encode
stimuli in working memory.
In sum, although there is a bulk of
evidence showing crosstalk and common-
alities between magnitude dimensions, a
magnitude system in which these dimen-
sions are monotonically mapped to each
other faces many empirical and conceptual
difficulties. We propose instead that over-
lap in computational constraints, working
memory, or decision/response processes
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across quantitative dimensions and tasks
may account for observed similarities.
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